Repetition aversion

Relatore
Leuvent Ulku - University of Verona

Data
1-ott-2026 - Ora: 12:00 Aula Vaona

We model an agent who holds a stable intrinsic preference over alternatives but also experiences repetition aversion—a dislike for choosing the same object again “too soon”, which leads the agent to temporarily exclude it from consideration. A long sequence of the agent’s choices is observed. Repetition aversion fundamentally disrupts the usual connection between preference and choice: even when x is both strictly intrinsically preferred to y and less repetition aversive, it may fail to be chosen more frequently than y. We provide a complete characterisation of repetition-averse choice sequences and establish how intrinsic preference can be disentangled from repetition aversion.

Data pubblicazione
17-set-2026

Referente
Alessandro Bucciol
Dipartimento
Scienze Economiche