- Seminari
- Repetition aversion
Repetition aversion
Relatore
Leuvent Ulku - University of Verona
Data
1-ott-2026 - Ora:
12:00
Aula Vaona
We model an agent who holds a stable intrinsic preference over alternatives but also experiences repetition aversion—a dislike for choosing the same object again “too soon”, which leads the agent to temporarily exclude it from consideration. A long sequence of the agent’s choices is observed. Repetition aversion fundamentally disrupts the usual connection between preference and choice: even when x is both strictly intrinsically preferred to y and less repetition aversive, it may fail to be chosen more frequently than y. We provide a complete characterisation of repetition-averse choice sequences and establish how intrinsic preference can be disentangled from repetition aversion.
- Data pubblicazione
- 17-set-2026
- Referente
- Alessandro Bucciol
- Dipartimento
- Scienze Economiche
